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ABSTRACT 
This research aimed to examine the relationship between executives compensation 
toward shareholder wealth with company performance as a moderating variable. The first is 
to examine whether executives compensation influences company performance. Secondly, it 
examines whether executives compensation influences shareholder wealth. Thirdly, it examines 
whether company performance influences shareholder wealth. Lastly is to examine whether 
executives compensation influences shareholder wealth with company performance as moder-
ating variable. The populations in this research are using the company that listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) and categorized as LQ45 index that falls from 2013-2015. This re-
search uses a purposive sampling method to collect a sample. The sample selected was ana-
lyzed using PLS (Partial Least Square) analysis which is an outer model and inner model. The 
results of this study show that executives compensation does not have a role to determine com-
pany performance. The second result shows that executives compensation has positive and 
influence shareholder wealth significantly. Another result shows that company performance 
has positive and influence shareholder wealth significantly. The last result shows that compa-
ny performance is not a moderating variable in the relationship between executives compensa-
tion and shareholder wealth. Company performance is an independent variable that has a pos-
itive and significant relationship with shareholder wealth.  
Keywords: : Executives Compensation, Shareholder Wealth, Company Perfor-
mance, Moderating Variable  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The company was established to generate profit and expected to live going 
concern. One of the key elements in strategic to live going concern. One of the key 
elements in strategic to live going concern is goal setting (Beggs & Lane, 1989). Goals 
are resolutions to achieve the desired result, where they provide a clear understanding 
of what the company is striving to accomplish based on the organizational mission and 
strategic objectives (Aziz & Fady, 2013). The success of a business will depend on its 
long-range goals for sales, profits, competitive position, development of personnel and 
industrial relations that require improvements on a regular basis (Aziz & Fady, 2013). 
To make these goals achievable, the most important things for the company is the con-
tribution of human capital. The positive impact of human capital in economic terms is 
reflected in contributing to faster economic growth, increasing employee productivity 
and lowering unemployment (Krstić, Stanojević, 2013: Đekić, 2015). People who have 
better education could avoid the risk of unemployment and poverty (Đekić, 2015). Es-
pecially in the economic side, the company that has a high quality of human capital 
can be regarded as a competitive company (Gu¨nther et al, 2003: Gamerschlag, 2012). 
Organizational structure can be divided into two models which are the one-tier 
model and two-tier model (Rezaee, 2009). Hereby, the researcher is more focused on 
the boards model. The one-tier model consists of directors are considered as the deci-
sion managers and have the power and duty to monitor those decisions (Rezaee, 2009). 
The two-tier model consists of a supervisory board and a management board, better 
known as the German board model, establishes different authorities and responsibili-
ties for members of each board (Rezaee, 2009). Based on the researcher’s findings in 
Indonesia use two-tier model for the public company which consists of the sharehold-
er, board of commissioners and board of directors. 
Furthermore, the company which has high quality and competent human capi-
tal within the company will be able for the company to achieve the goals. There is the 
main factor that make the company have a good performance called compensations 
toward employees (Conyon and Lerong He, 2011). Compensation is an effective way 
to stimulate management to improve company performance (Guo, 2013). Based on 
Dessler 1998:45 and Khasanah 2013, there are two types of compensation as follow: 
direct financial payments in the form of salaries, wages, incentives and for the pay-
ment is not directly in the form of benefits such as insurance and vacation.  
Compensation is deemed as one of the important aspects for the company, it 
reflects the company in doing business by maintaining the prosperity of the employees 
and ability to drive the stability and economic growth of the company (BanghǾj et al, 
2010; Barontini and Bozzi, 2011; Rashid, 2013). Basically, every company has a dif-
ferent amount of compensation, it depends on the position or level for each person and 
the type of jobs. There is no provision about the amount of top-level management 
compensation because of the compensation earned by top-level management base on 
the size of the company (i.e. embryonic, intermediate or big company), the economic 
growth and complexity of the top-level management jobs (Sigler, 2011). 
In this research choose to focus more on executives compensation. Top-level 
management compensation is the most debated and controversial topics in corporate 
governance literature (BanghǾj et al, 2010; Barontini and Bozzi, 2011; Rashid, 2013). 
In Indonesia, the research of top-level management compensation is not being exposed 
as much as in other countries. This top-level management compensation controversy is 
becoming the main topic in the business environment that reported in mass media such 
as magazine and newspaper (Otten, 2008). The factors might include for top-level 
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management compensation are company performance, executive productivity, and 
management. 
In contrarily, top-level management compensation also might lead “culture of 
gamesmanship” in the business environment in the accent on gaining short term results 
such as exceeding financial earnings expectations or future company performance 
(Levitt, 1998). The example of a culture of gamesmanship is earning management. 
Earning management is the action of manager or executive by increasing or decreasing 
some accounts or earnings that reported at this period without decreasing or increasing 
the value of that accounts and not giving an impact to the long-term profitability. 
Additionally, it would like to research whether executives compensation also 
giving an impact to the shareholder’s wealth or neither. Based on the studies of com-
pensation in stock have shown that distribution of stock is positively having a linkage 
to the top-level management compensation of increasing shareholder’s wealth (Costa, 
2000; Baker, 1992; Banker and Datar, 1989). The disclosure of compensation makes it 
fairly easy to calculate the standard measurement of incentive strength which has a 
high percentage of pay to create shareholder’s wealth (Stephen F, David Y, 2010). 
Based on the introduction above, this research tries to answer the problem or 
research question as follows about how are the relationship of executives compensa-
tion and performance towards company performance, shareholder’s wealth and also 
how is the relationship of executives compensation towards shareholder’s wealth that 
moderated by company performance. From this research expected to provide some 
benefits to various parties; Provide the information to management about how to im-
prove and exceed the company performance in order to push the shareholder’s value 
being up, exceeding the goals and expectations or below goals and expectations, and 
provide the information to shareholders in order to make the regulation of executive 
compensation and contract management are being decided in Annual General Meeting 
for the future. 
We develop our hypothesis in the next section. Following this research de-
scribes the method, including our sample and design. Then this research presents the 
analyses, result, and the test of its hypotheses. In the last section is the conclusion. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Relationship of Executives Compensation Towards Company Performance 
The implementation of good and fair compensation system of executives is ex-
pected to improve each executives performance. Additionally, executives are also ex-
pected to be able to lead and encourage the company to achieve good performance tar-
gets. Hence the roles and responsibilities of executives are to represent shareholders, 
define company’s mission and vision, establish and approve strategic plans and deci-
sions to achieve the goals, oversee the company performance and approve major busi-
ness transactions and corporate plans, decisions and actions (Rezaee, 2009). Hereby, it 
can be said that executives have a big role over the company. If the implementation of 
the good and fair compensation system for executives is to succeed, thus the highly 
performed executives will be paid higher (Rashid, 2013). 
Rashid (2013) found that regression analysis shows there is a positive relation-
ship between executive pay and firm performance with ROA as the measurement of 
firm performance in Bangladesh. 
Martin et al (2015) found that top-level management compensation is positive-
ly correlated to firm performance. The study said that firm with more independent di-
rectors on the board has a higher pay-for-performance link. 
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H1: Executives compensation has relationship with company performance 
 
The Relationship of Executives Compensation Towards Shareholder Wealth 
Byrne and Young (2010) there is sensitivity about changes in top-level man-
agement wealth to changes in shareholders wealth. It means that if there are 1% chang-
es in top-level management wealth will be equal with changes in shareholders wealth. 
Hence executives compensation has a role to determine the shareholder wealth. It is 
supported by previous research that there is a high sensitivity relationship between top-
level management compensation and shareholder wealth maximization (Tarus et al, 
2014). 
H2: Executives compensation has relationship with shareholder wealth 
 
The Relationship of Company Performance Towards Shareholder Wealth 
Company performance is the results of business activities that have been done 
over the current year. The measurement of company performance can use financial 
ratios such as ROA, ROE, NPM, revenue, profit and productivity (Twairesh, 2014). 
The better company performance achieved, thus the better return that shareholder get. 
Hence, the higher the profit that the company earned, then the shareholder will get also 
a high dividend payment. The dividend payment in Indonesia usually around 25% - 
30% of the company’s profit. This based on the researcher findings in the sample se-
lected. The measurement of shareholder wealth is using dividend (Kieso & Weygant, 
2011), Total Shareholder Return or it can be called as TSR (Byrne and Young, 2014) 
and DPR (Dividend Payout Ratio). Previous research stated that company which 
achieves good social performance and good financial performance have higher relation 
with shareholder wealth (Pamela, 2014). 
H3: Company performance has relationship with shareholder wealth 
 
The Relationship of Executives Compensation Towards Shareholder Wealth with 
Company Performance as Moderating Variable 
Shareholder wealth can be influenced by several factors, one of the factors is 
executives compensation. Additionally, there is another factor that will influence the 
shareholder wealth namely company performance.  
Based on the previous research done by Satria (2013) which stated that there is 
a positive result of compensation for company performance in the 1st hypothesis. Sec-
ondly, based on the regression analysis said that work motivation cannot be as moder-
ating variable. Lastly, the researcher did the 3rd hypothesis about the relationship be-
tween work motivation and employee performance. From the 3rd regression analysis 
stated that the moderating variable in this study serves as an independent variable that 
directly affects the employee performance. 
H4: Company performance has an impact on Executives compensation 
and shareholder wealth. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD  
 
Population and Sample 
The disclosure of executives compensation is a summation of salary, bonus, 
stock, facilities and post-employment benefits. In this study, the information data 
about compensation are not compulsory to get all or part of 5 components (salary, bo-
nus, stock, facilities and post-employment benefits), hence every company has a dif-
ferent kind of compensation package that is discussed in Annual General Meeting. The 
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data on 3 years of executives compensation, the dividend paid, ROA, ROE, NPM, 
TSR, DPR 2013-2015, were collected from 24 listed companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange website from LQ45 index that listed 3 years in a row. 
The sample is determined using Purposive Sampling Technique in order to ob-
tain a representative sample. The sample have common criteria such as: 
The sample must have the financial statement for 3 years and categorized in LQ45 in-
dex that listed 3 years in a row from 2013-2015. 
The financial statement must provide information about executives compensation. 
Compensation information has to be included board of directors and commissioners. 
The financial statement must provide information about Earning Per Share (EPS) in 3 
years. 
The financial statement must provide information about dividend and stock price for 3 
years (2013-2015). For the company that does not do dividend payment and has incon-
sistent financial information, it should be taken out from the sample list. 
The financial statement in LQ45 index has to be audited. 
 
Models 
This research is used PLS (Partial Least Square) analysis. PLS is used to deter-
mine the complexity of the relationship of a variable with other variables and the rela-
tionship of a variable with the indicators. PLS is a research method typically used to 
explain or predict the behavior of variables, especially when variables are highly re-
dundant (Queen, 2014). 
To answer the problems or questions of this research, the data analysis tech-
nique used are: 
 
Outer Model 
The outer model can also be called a measurement model. This model aims to 
measure the relationship between indicators and the construct. The indicators can be 
valid if the score or loading factor is above 0.5. If the score or loading factor is below 
0.5, the indicator should be taken out and it can be called as indicator modification 
(Hussein, 2015). 
 
Discriminant Validity Test with Cross Loading 
Discriminant validity is a validation testing of an indicator towards the differ-
ent construct. The indicator can be stated as valid if having a high loading factor to ad-
dressed construct rather than a different construct. The result of discriminant validity is 
cross-shaped which called as cross-loading (Hussein, 2015). Cross loading shows how 
strong each construct that contains other (non-target) indicator. Usually, the main indi-
cator has a higher loading factor on the addressed constructor main construct, so the 
result will be cross-shaped (Hussein, 2015). 
 
Reliability Testing 
Reliability testing is used to determine whether the indicators are really valid 
and reliable to be tested to reflect each main construct. There are three components to 
test the reliability of indicators are as follow: 
AVE (Average Variance Extracted) 
AVE is used to measure an average variance value of indicators to the same construct. 
The higher value of AVE means that the data have variation and there is no the same 
data with suggested value is above 0.5 (Hussein, 2015). 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
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Cronbach’s Alpha shows about the average correlation value of indicator that 
measures the same construct. The suggested value of Cronbach’s Alpha is above 0.7 
(Hussein, 2015). 
R Square (Coefficient of Determination) 
R Square or coefficient of determination is to determine how strong all the indicator 
explain the variance data of the dependent variable. For R Square, there is no suggest-
ed value (Hussein, 2015). 
Composite Reliability 
Composite reliability is to measure or examine the indicator of each construct whether 
the indicator really has a strong impact to analyze or reflect the addressed construct. 
The suggested value of composite reliability is above 0.7 (Hussein, 2015). 
 
Inner Model 
The inner model can also be called a structural model. This model aims to 
measure the significant or insignificant relationship between construct and it can be 
seen in t-statistics and P-Value. If the result of t-statistics is above 1.96 (t-statistics > 
1.96) and the result of P-Value is below 0.05 (P Value < 0.05) mean that the result is 
giving a positive impact significantly. Contrarily, if the result of t-statistics is below 
1.96 and the result of P-Value is above 0.05 mean that the result is giving a negative 
impact or there is no relationship between variable (Hussein, 2015). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The Relationship of Executives Compensation Toward Company Performance 
T 
he 1st hypothesis testing has completed testing about the impact of executives 
on company performance. The output of Smartly for the modified loading factor can 
be viewed in table 1:  
 
Table 1. Construct Outer Loading of Executives Compensation and  
Company Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: The Results of Data Processing with Smartly 3.0 
 
  Executives 
Compensation 
Company  
Performance 
Y1 0.990   
Y2 0.998   
Y3 0.990   
X1   0.854 
X2   0.855 
X3   0.912 
X4   0.931 
X5   0.937 
X6   0.906 
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As shown on table 1, it can be known that the loading factor for the construct 
of executives Compensation involve: 2013 compensation is 0.990, 2014 compensation 
is 0.998 and 2015 compensation is 0.990. While the construct of company perfor-
mance involves: 2013 ROA is 0.854, 2014 ROA is 0.855, 2015 ROA is 0.912, 2013 
ROE is 0.931, 2014 ROE is 0.937 and 2015 ROE is 0.906. The greater value of load-
ing factor can determine the indicator’s ability to reflect the construct tested in the dia-
gram.  
Base on table 1 above, it stated that 2014 compensation is the indicator of exec-
utives Compensation that has a big impact then followed with 2013 compensation and 
2015 compensation. Whereas, for an indicator of company performance that has a big 
impact is 2014 ROE then followed with 2013 ROE, 2015 ROA, and ROE. While 2013 
and 2014 ROA have a small impact than the other four indicators.  
In this research, the reflective indicator also needs to be tested to determine the 
discriminant validity with cross loading as follow: 
 
Table 2. Cross Loading of Executives Compensation and Company Performance 
Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
An indicator can be declared as valid if having the higher loading factor to addressed 
construct rather than loading factor to another construct. The table above shows that 
loading factor to compensation indicator (Y1 until Y3) have the higher value to ad-
dressed construct than another construct. For the illustration: Loading factor of Y1 to 
executives Compensation is 0.990 rather than loading factor to company performance 
(0.086). Similarly, the other indicators also have a small impact on the different con-
struct. Therefore, the construct predicts that indicator from their group is better than 
the indicator from another group.  
    Reliability testing can be strengthened using Cronbach’s Alpha with a suggested 
value above 0.7, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.5 and Composite Relia-
bility above 0.7. It has analyzed and fulfills the criteria of the outer model, the next 
testing is using inner model (Structural Model). This inner model is aimed to look for 
the significant and insignificant result of each hypothesis. The results of validity and 
reliability testing of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability can be seen in 
table 3. 
  Executives Com-
pensation 
Company Perfor-
mance 
Y1 0.990 0.086 
Y2 0.998 0.060 
Y3 0.990 0.080 
X1 - 0.216 0.854 
X2 - 0.248 0.855 
X3 0.100 0.912 
X4 0.121 0.931 
X5 0.101 0.937 
X6 0.293 0.906 
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Table 3. The Results of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite  
Reliability Testing 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
Table 3 showed that the information that is gathered in this research are: 
1.    The results of AVE from the variable of executives compensation and company 
performance are valid and reliable. Because the results are above 0.5 as suggested val-
ue of AVE. The result of AVE in executives compensation is 0.985. It means that the 
average variance value of executives compensation’s indicators is 98.5% and statisti-
cally, the collected data is really having a high variation. The result of AVE in compa-
ny performance is 0.810. It means that the average variance value of company perfor-
mance’s indicators is 81% and statistically, the collected data is really having a high 
variation. 
2.    The results of Cronbach’s Alpha from the variable of executives compensation 
and company performance are valid and reliable. The average correlation result of all 
indicator that measures the same construct already meet the standard of 0.7. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha of executives compensation and company performance are 0.993 
and 0.954. 
3.    The result of R square from company performance as the dependent variable is 
0.006. It means that company performance is only influenced by 0.6% with the inter-
action of executives compensation and shareholder wealth variable. The remaining 
amount of 99.4% is influenced by other variables outside this research model. 
4.    The results of composite reliability from the variable of executives compensation 
and company performance are valid and reliable and fulfill the suggested value of 0.7. 
The composite reliability of executives compensation is 0.995 means that the indicator 
(i.e. compensation of 2013-2015) has a strong impact to reflect the executives' com-
pensation construct. Additionally, the composite reliability of company performance is 
0.962 means that the indicator (i.e. ROA and ROE) has a strong impact to reflect the 
company performance construct.  
Table 4. The Value of tstatistics (Outer Model) for Executives Compensation and 
Company Performance 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  AVE Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
R Square Composite 
Reliability 
Executives Compensation 0.985 0.993   0.995 
Company Performance 0.810 0.954 0.006 0.962 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/ 
STERR|) 
P Val-
ue 
Y1 <- Executives Compensation 0.990 0.991 0.004 249.077 0.000 
Y2 <- Executives Compensation 0.998 0.997 0.002 523.025 0.000 
Y3 <- Executives Compensation 0.990 0.990 0.006 154.495 0.000 
X1 <- Company Performance 0.854 0.814 0.175 4.878 0.000 
X2 <- Company Performance 0.855 0.811 0.192 4.464 0.000 
X3 <- Company Performance 0.912 0.883 0.130 6.989 0.000 
X4 <- Company Performance 0.931 0.930 0.037 25.367 0.000 
X5 <- Company Performance 0.937 0.936 0.038 24.364 0.000 
X6 <- Company Performance 0.906 0.900 0.066 13.775 0.000 
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As shown table 4, all the indicators on each construct have a significant posi-
tive result. It can be seen in t-statistics is higher than 1.96 for all indicators. It means 
that all indicators are able to reflect the construct tested significantly. 
The original sample presents how the value of the loading factor can give an 
impact to one construct and another construct. The greater loading factor presents a big 
impact on one construct to another construct. The significant information about the 
relationship of executives compensation and company performance can be seen in t-
statistics in the table below: 
 
Table 5. The Value of tstatistics About the Relationship of Executives Compensation 
Toward Company Performance 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
As shown on table 5 is known that the impact of executives compensation towards 
company performance has a loading factor of 0.076 with t-statistics below 1.96 (0.323 
< 1.96). Additionally, the result of P-Value is above 0.05 means that statistically, it is 
not acceptable. It can be significant if the t-statistics is above 1.96 and P-Value is be-
low 0.05. So, based on the findings above can be concluded that the 1st hypothesis 
states that executives compensation does not have a role to determine company perfor-
mance. For the summary of 1st hypothesis analysis testing presented in the table be-
low: 
Table 6. Summary of 1st Hypothesis Analysis Testing 
 
 
 
 
      Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
 Based on the findings can be concluded the 1st hypothesis result states that exec-
utives compensation does not have a role to determine company performance. Nourayi 
et al (2008) stated that the findings are negatively correlated between executives com-
pensation and company performance. Additionally, Chiang et al (2011) stated that ex-
ecutives compensation is negatively associated with company performance as predict-
ed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
Executives Compensation -> 
Company Performance 
0.076 0.087 0.236 0.323 0.747 
  Outer Model Inner Model 
tstatistics 
Explanation 
The impact of executives compensa-
tion towards company performance 
0.076 0.323 Negative result 
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Table 7. Construct Outer Loading of Executives Compensation and Shareholder 
Wealth  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
As shown on table 7, it can be known that the loading factor for the construct 
of executives Compensation involve: 2013 compensation is 0.990, 2014 compensation 
is 0.998 and 2015 compensation is 0.990. While the construct of shareholder wealth 
involves: 2013 dividend is 0.859, 2014 dividend is 0.876, 2015 dividend is 0.832, 2013 
Earning Per Share (EPS) is 0.872, 2014 Earning Per Share (EPS) is 0.847 and 2015 
Earning Per Share (EPS) is 0.868. The greater value of loading factor can determine 
the indicator’s ability to reflect the construct tested in the diagram.  
Based on table 7, it stated that 2014 compensation is the indicator of executives 
Compensation that has a big impact then followed with 2013 compensation and 2014 
compensation. Whereas, for an indicator of shareholder wealth that has a big impact is 
2014 dividend then followed with 2013 EPS, 2015 EPS and 2013 dividend. While the 
2015 dividend and 2014 EPS have a small impact than the other four indicators.  
In this research, the reflective indicator also needs to be tested to determine the discri-
minant validity with cross loading as follow: 
 
Table 8. Cross Loading of Executives Compensation and Shareholder Wealth 
Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
An indicator can be declared as valid if having the higher loading factor to addressed 
construct rather than loading factor to another construct. The table above shows that 
loading factor to compensation indicator (Y1 until Y3) have the higher value to ad-
dressed construct than another construct and also show that loading factor to share-
holder wealth indicators (X1 until X6) has the higher value to addressed construct than 
  Executives Compensation Shareholder Wealth 
Y1 0.990   
Y2 0.998   
Y3 0.990   
X1   0.859 
X2   0.876 
X3   0.832 
X4   0.872 
X5   0.847 
X6   0.868 
  Executives 
Compensation 
Shareholder 
Wealth 
Y1 0.990 0.485 
Y2 0.998 0.439 
Y3 0.990 0.446 
X1 0.597 0.859 
X2 0.582 0.876 
X3 0.293 0.832 
X4 0.228 0.872 
X5 0.200 0.847 
X6 0.343 0.868 
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another construct. For the illustration: Loading factor of X1 to shareholder wealth is 
0.859 rather than loading factor to executives compensation (0.597). Similarly, the oth-
er indicators also have a small impact on the different construct. Therefore, the con-
struct predicts that indicator from their group is better than the indicator from another 
group.  
 Reliability testing can be strengthened using Cronbach’s Alpha with the suggest-
ed value above 0.7, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.5 and Composite Re-
liability above 0.7. It has analyzed and fulfills the criteria of the outer model, the next 
testing is using inner model (Structural Model). This inner model is aimed to look for 
the significant and insignificant result of each hypothesis. The results of validity and 
reliability testing of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability can be seen in 
table 9. 
 
Table 9. The Results of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability  
Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
Table 9, explain that the information that are gathered in this research are: 
1. The results of AVE from the variable of Executives compensation and share-
holder wealth are valid and reliable. Because the results are above 0.5 as suggest-
ed value of AVE. The result of AVE in executives compensation is 0.985. It 
means that the average variance value of executives compensation’s indicators is 
98.5% and statistically, the collected data is really having a high variation. The 
result of AVE in shareholder wealth is 0.738. It means that the average variance 
value of company performance’s indicators is 73.8% and statistically, the col-
lected data is really having a high variation. 
2. The results of Cronbach’s Alpha from the variable of executives compensation 
and shareholder wealth are valid and reliable. The average correlation result of 
all indicator that measures the same construct already meet the standard of 0.7. 
The Cronbach’s Alpha of executives compensation and shareholder wealth are 
0.993 and 0.930. 
3. The result of R square from shareholder wealth as the dependent variable is 
0.629. It means that shareholder wealth is highly influenced by 62.9% with the 
interaction of executives compensation and company performance variable. The 
remaining amount of 37.1% is influenced by other variables outside this research 
model. 
4. The results of composite reliability from the variable of executives compensation 
and shareholder wealth are valid and reliable and fulfill the suggested value of 
0.7. The composite reliability of executives compensation is 0.995 means that 
the indicator (i.e. compensation of 2013-2015) has a strong impact to reflect the 
executives' compensation construct. Additionally, the composite reliability of 
shareholder wealth is 0.944 means that the indicator (i.e. dividend and EPS) has 
a strong impact to reflect the shareholder wealth construct. 
 
  AVE Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
R Square Composite 
Reliability 
Executives Compensation 0.985 0.993   0.995 
Shareholder Wealth 0.738 0.930 0.629 0.944 
Prabowo, A., Sari, D.P.I. (2020).  
Journal of Business and Behavioural Entrepreneurship Volume 4 Number 1 2020 p (91-111) 
 Executives Compensation Impact Toward Shareholder Wealth: Company Performance 
(Empirical Study of Listed Companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Categorized as LQ45 
Index).  
 https://doi.org/10.21009/JOBBE.004.1.07 
102 
 
Table 10. The Value of tstatistics (Outer Model) for Executives Compensation and 
Shareholder Wealth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
As shown the table 10, all the indicators on each construct have a significant 
positive result. It can be seen in t-statistics is higher than 1.96 for all indicators. It 
means that all indicators are able to reflect the construct tested significantly. 
The original sample presents how the value of the loading factor can give an 
impact to one construct and another construct. The greater loading factor presents a big 
impact on one construct to another construct. The significant information about the 
relationship of executives compensation and shareholder wealth can be seen in t-
statistics in table 11: 
 
Table 11. The Value of tstatistics About the Relationship of Executives Compensa-
tion Toward Shareholder Wealth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 As shown the table 11 explained that the impact of executives compensation to-
wards shareholder wealth has a loading factor 0.500 with t-statistics above 1.96 (3.247 
> 1.96) or giving a positive significant impact. In another side, the result of P-Value is 
below 0.05 (0.001 < 0.05) means that statistically, it is acceptable. Based on the find-
ings above can be concluded that the 2nd hypothesis states that executives compensa-
tion has a role to determine shareholder wealth significantly. For the summary of 2nd 
hypothesis analysis testing presented in the table 12: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statis-
tics (|O/
STERR|) 
P Val-
ue 
Y1 <- Executives Compensation 0.990 0.991 0.004 249.077 0.000 
Y2 <- Executives Compensation 0.998 0.997 0.002 523.025 0.000 
Y3 <- executives Compensation 0.990 0.990 0.006 154.495 0.000 
X1 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.859 0.870 0.037 23.259 0.000 
X2 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.876 0.882 0.039 22.278 0.000 
X3 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.832 0.855 0.061 13.601 0.000 
X4 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.872 0.863 0.078 11.249 0.000 
X5 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.847 0.838 0.084 10.089 0.000 
X6 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.868 0.860 0.068 12.805 0.000 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
Executives Compensation 
-> Shareholder Wealth 
0.500 0.494 0.154 3.247 0.001 
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Table 12. Summary of 2nd Hypothesis Analysis Testing 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
Based on the findings can be concluded the 2nd hypothesis result states that 
executives compensation give an impact to shareholder wealth significantly and statis-
tically, it is acceptable. This finding in accordance with previous research done by Ta-
rus et al (2014) which stated that there is a high sensitivity relationship between execu-
tives compensation and shareholder wealth maximization. 
 
The Relationship of Company Performance Toward Shareholder Wealth 
Table 13. Construct Outer Loading of Company Performance and Shareholder 
Wealth  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
As shown in table 13 above, it can be known that the loading factor for the con-
struct of company performance involve: 2013 ROA is 0.854, 2014 ROA is 0.855, 2015 
ROA is 0.912, 2013 ROE is 0.931, 2014 ROE is 0.937 and 2015 ROE is 0.906. While 
the construct of shareholder wealth involves: 2013 dividend is 0.859, 2014 dividend is 
0.876, 2015 dividend is 0.832, 2013 EPS is 0.872, 2014 EPS is 0.847 and 2015 EPS is 
0.868. The greater value of loading factor can determine the indicator’s ability to re-
flect the construct tested in the diagram.  
Based on table 13 above, it stated that 2014 ROE is the indicator of company 
performance that has a big impact then followed with 2013 ROE, 2015 ROA, and 
ROE, while 2013 and 2014 ROA has the smaller impact than the other four indicators. 
Whereas, for an indicator of shareholder wealth that has a big impact is 2014 dividend 
then followed with 2013 EPS, 2015 EPS and 2013 dividend. While the 2015 dividend 
and 2014 EPS have a small impact than the other four indicators.  
In this research, the reflective indicator also needs to be tested to determine the 
discriminant validity with cross loading as follow: 
  Outer Model Inner Model 
tstatistics 
Explanation 
The impact of executives compen-
sation towards shareholder wealth 
0.500 3.247 Positive signifi-
cant 
  Company Performance Shareholder Wealth 
X1 0.854   
X2 0.855   
X3 0.912   
X4 0.931   
X5 0.937   
X6 0.906   
X1   0.859 
X2   0.876 
X3   0.832 
X4   0.872 
X5   0.847 
X6   0.868 
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Table 14. Cross Loading of Company Performance and Shareholder 
 Wealth Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
 An indicator can be declared as valid if having the higher loading factor to ad-
dressed construct rather than loading factor to another construct. The table above 
shows that loading factor to company performance indicator (X1 until X6) has the 
higher value to addressed construct than another construct and also show that loading 
factor to shareholder wealth indicators (X1 until X6) has the higher value to addressed 
construct than another construct. For the illustration: Loading factor of X1 to company 
performance is 0.854 rather than loading factor to shareholder wealth (0.401). Similar-
ly, the other indicators also have a small impact on the different construct. Therefore, 
the construct predicts that indicator from their group is better than the indicator from 
another group.  
Reliability testing can be strengthened using Cronbach’s Alpha with a suggest-
ed value above 0.7, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.5 and Composite Re-
liability above 0.7. It has analyzed and fulfills the criteria of the outer model, the next 
testing is using inner model (Structural Model). This inner model is aimed to look for 
the significant and insignificant result of each hypothesis. The results of validity and 
reliability testing of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability can be seen in 
table 15. 
 
Table 15. The Results of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite  
Reliability Testing 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
Table 15 showed the information that are gathered in this research are: 
1. The results of AVE from variable of company performance and shareholder 
wealth are valid and reliable. Because the results are above 0.5 as suggested val-
ue of AVE. The result of AVE in company performance is 0.810. It means that 
the average variance value of company performance’s indicators is 81% and sta-
tistically, the collected data is really having a high variation. The result of AVE 
  Company Performance Shareholder Wealth 
X1 0.854 0.401 
X2 0.855 0.419 
X3 0.912 0.584 
X4 0.931 0.604 
X5 0.937 0.642 
X6 0.906 0.677 
X1 0.550 0.859 
X2 0.501 0.876 
X3 0.628 0.832 
X4 0.506 0.872 
X5 0.464 0.847 
X6 0.617 0.868 
  AVE Cronbach’s Alpha Composite Reliability 
Company Performance 0.810 0.954 0.962 
Shareholder Wealth 0.738 0.930 0.944 
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in shareholder wealth is 0.738. It means that the average variance value of com-
pany shareholder wealth’s indicators is 73.8% and statistically, the collected data 
is really having a high variation. 
2. The results of Cronbach’s Alpha from variable of company performance and 
shareholder wealth are valid and reliable. The average correlation result of all 
indicator that measure the same construct already meet the standard of 0.7. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha of company performance and shareholder wealth are 0.954 
and 0.930. 
3. The results of composite reliability from variable of executives compensation 
and company performance are valid and reliable and fulfil the suggested value of 
0.7. The composite reliability of executives compensation is 0.995 means that the 
indicator (i.e. compensation of 2013-2015) has a strong impact to reflect the ex-
ecutives compensation construct. Additionally, the composite reliability of com-
pany performance is 0.962 means that the indicator (i.e. ROA and ROE) has a 
strong impact to reflect the company performance construct. 
 
Table 16. The Value of tstatistics (Outer Model) for Company Performance and 
Shareholder Wealth 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
As shown in table 16 above, all the indicators on each construct have a signifi-
cant positive result. It can be seen in t-statistics is higher than 1.96 to all indicators. It 
means that all indicators are able to reflect the construct tested significantly. The origi-
nal sample presents how the value of the loading factor can give an impact to one con-
struct and another construct. The greater loading factor presents a big impact on one 
construct to another construct. The significant information about the relationship be-
tween company performance and shareholder wealth can be seen in t-statistics in table 
17: 
 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Val-
ue 
X1 <- Company Performance 0.854 0.814 0.175 4.878 0.000 
X2 <- Company Performance 0.855 0.811 0.192 4.464 0.000 
X3 <- Company Performance 0.912 0.883 0.130 6.989 0.000 
X4 <- Company Performance 0.931 0.930 0.037 25.367 0.000 
X5 <- Company Performance 0.937 0.936 0.038 24.364 0.000 
X6 <- Company Performance 0.906 0.900 0.066 13.775 0.000 
X1 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.859 0.870 0.037 23.259 0.000 
X2 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.876 0.882 0.039 22.278 0.000 
X3 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.832 0.855 0.061 13.601 0.000 
X4 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.872 0.863 0.078 11.249 0.000 
X5 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.847 0.838 0.084 10.089 0.000 
X6 <- Shareholder Wealth 0.868 0.860 0.068 12.805 0.000 
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Table 17. The Value of tstatistics About the Relationship of Company Performance 
Toward Shareholder Wealth 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
  
 As shown in Table 17 above is known that the impact of company performance 
towards shareholder wealth has a loading factor of 0.770 with t-statistics above 1.96 
(5.816 > 1.96) or giving a positive significant impact. In another side, the result of P-
Value is below 0.05 (0.000 < 0.05) means that statistically, it is acceptable. Based on 
the findings above can be concluded that the 3rd hypothesis states company perfor-
mance has a role to determine shareholder wealth significantly. For the summary of 
3rd hypothesis analysis testing presented in table 18: 
 
Table 18. Summary of 3rd Hypothesis Analysis Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
 The findings explained that the 3rd hypothesis result states that company perfor-
mance gives an impact to shareholder wealth significantly and statistically, it is ac-
ceptable. This finding in accordance to previous research done by Queen (2014) which 
stated that company which achieves good social performance and good financial per-
formance have higher relation with shareholder wealth.  
 
The Relationship of Executives Compensation Toward Shareholder Wealth and 
Moderated by Company Performance 
The 4th hypothesis testing has completed testing about the impact of executives 
compensation towards shareholder wealth moderated by company performance. The 
picture below is showing the 4th hypothesis result diagram before and after doing the 
modification for all three hypotheses. 
 
Table 19. Construct Outer Loading of Executives Compensation and Shareholder  
Wealth with Company Performance as Moderating Variable 
 
 
 
 
 Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 Note:  
 *: Two-way test 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
Company Performance -> Share-
holder Wealth 
0.736 0.720 0.127 5.816 0.000 
  Outer Model Inner Model 
tstatistics 
Explanation 
The impact of company perfor-
mance towards shareholder 
wealth 
0.736 5.816 Positive signifi-
cant 
  Moderating Effect 
Executives Compensation * Company Performance 0.988 
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As shown in table 19 above, it explained that the loading factor for the con-
struct of executives compensation and company performance involve all the indicators 
of each construct such as ROA, ROE and executives Compensation. The greater value 
of loading factor can determine the indicator’s ability to reflect the construct tested in 
the diagram.  
Reliability testing can use Cronbach’s Alpha with the suggested value above 
0.7, Average Variance Extracted (AVE) above 0.5 and Composite Reliability above 
0.7. It has analyzed and fulfills the criteria of the outer model, the next testing is using 
inner model (Structural Model). The results of validity and reliability testing of AVE, 
Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability can be seen in table 20. 
 
Table 20. The Results of AVE, Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite  
Reliability Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
Table 20 showed that the information that are gathered in this research are: 
1. The results of AVE from executives compensation and shareholder wealth with 
company performance as moderating variable are valid and reliable. Because the 
results are above 0.5 as suggested value of AVE. The result of AVE in this hy-
pothesis is 1.000. It means that the average variance value of 4th hypothesis’s 
indicators in each construct and company performance as moderating variable is 
100% and statistically, the collected data is really having a high variation. 
2. The results of Cronbach’s Alpha from executives compensation and shareholder 
wealth with company performance as moderating variable are valid and reliable. 
The average correlation result of all indicator in the 4th hypothesis with compa-
ny performance as moderating variable that measures each construct already 
meet the standard of 0.7. The Cronbach’s Alpha of 4th hypothesis is 1.000 or 
100% valid to reflect each construct. 
3. The results of composite reliability from executives compensation and share-
holder wealth with company performance as moderating variable are valid and 
reliable and fulfill the suggested value of 0.7. The composite reliability of 4th 
hypothesis is 0.995 means that the indicator in each construct has a strong impact 
to reflect the 4th hypothesis which company performance as moderating varia-
ble. 
 
Table 21. The Value of tstatistics (Outer Model) for Executives Compensation and 
Shareholder Wealth with Company Performance as Moderating Variable 
  AVE Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite Reli-
ability 
Executives Compensation * Company 
Performance <- Moderating Effect 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Val-
ue 
Executives Compensation * Com-
pany Performance <- Moderating 
Effect 
0.988 0.950 0.252 3.922 0.000 
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As shown in table 21 above, all the indicators on executives compensation and 
company performance have a significant positive result. It can be seen in t-statistics is 
higher than 1.96 to all construct. It means that all indicators are able to reflect the con-
struct tested significantly. 
The original sample presents how the value of the loading factor can give an 
impact to one construct and another construct. The greater loading factor presents a big 
impact on one construct to another construct. The significant information about the 
relationship of executives compensation towards shareholder wealth with company 
performance as moderating variable can be seen in t-statistics in table 22: 
 
Table 22. The Value of tstatistics About the Relationship of Executives Compensa-
tion Toward Shareholder Wealth with Company Performance as Moderating 
Variable 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 As shown in Table 22 above is known that the impact of executives compensa-
tion towards shareholder wealth with company performance as moderating variable 
has a loading factor of 0.278 with t-statistics below 1.96 (1.585 < 1.96). Additionally, 
the result of P-Value is above 0.05 (0.114 > 0.05) means that statistically, it is not ac-
ceptable. Based on the findings above can be concluded that the 4th hypothesis states 
company performance as moderating variable does not have a role to determine the 
relationship between executives compensation and shareholder wealth. For the sum-
mary of 4th hypothesis analysis testing presented in table 23: 
 
Table 23. Summary of 4th Hypothesis Analysis Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Results of Data Processing with SmartPLS 3.0 
 
 The findings conclude that the 4th hypothesis result is company performance as 
moderating variable does not have a role to determine the relationship between execu-
tives compensation and shareholder wealth and statistically, it is not acceptable. This 
finding in accordance with previous research done by Satria (2013) which stated that 
there is a positive result of compensation towards company performance in the 1st hy-
pothesis. But in the 2nd hypothesis, based on the regression analysis said that work 
motivation cannot be as moderating variable. Thus, the researcher did the 3rd hypothe-
sis about the relationship between work motivation and employee performance. From 
the 3rd regression analysis stated that the moderating variable in this study serves as an 
independent variable that directly affects the employee performance. 
 
 
  Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
Moderating effect 1 -> Sharehold-
er Wealth 
0.278 0.245 0.176 1.585 0.114 
  Outer Model Inner Model 
tstatistics 
Explanation 
The impact of executives Compensa-
tion towards shareholder wealth mod-
erated by company performance 
0.278 1.585 Negative result 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, this study about the relationship between executives compensation to-
ward shareholder wealth with company performance as moderating variable is being 
rejected. Company performance cannot be a moderating variable but serves as an inde-
pendent variable that directly affects the shareholder wealth, it can be proved in the 3rd 
hypothesis. 
 
Limitations 
This research contains the following limitations; executives compensation is 
only measured by the total amount of compensation. It is not measured separately for 
each item of executives compensation. It happens because some of the company does 
not give the detail information in the annual report. 
Indicators that used to predict company performance is only ROA (Return on 
Asset) and ROE (Return on Equity). In another side, there are still many indicators can 
be used to measure the performance of the company such as productivity, the percent-
age of employee turnover, organizational culture, job satisfaction, and other financial 
ratios. 
Some company that listed in LQ45 in the year of 2013-2015 did not do divi-
dend payment. This causes some company has to be taken out from the sample select-
ed. The sample selected in this research is from LQ45 index which should be listed in 
LQ45 index 3 years in a row from 2013-2015. 
 
Suggestion 
The author’s suggestion is better than executives compensation measure based 
on shareholder wealth rather than company performance. Additionally, the measure-
ment of executives compensation can be done by comparing the percentage of execu-
tives compensation of other company in the same industry. 
 
Recommendations 
In further research can be done in more detail for each type of compensation 
that exists, so the results obtained will better describe the existing condition more 
clearly. For the next research, the measurement of company performance can use more 
indicators such as other financial ratios, revenue, employee turnover, and other indica-
tors. 
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